We use a classic Merton credit risk framework to argue that Islamic Banking Institutions (IBIs) face less incentive to take on risks than Conventional Banking Institutions (CBI). IBIs have less incentive for risk shifting both in and outside of distress situations. We test and confirm this prediction in an empirical analysis based on a dataset covering all CBIs, IBIs, and Islamic and conventional subsidiaries of mixed banking institutions in Pakistan. We find that full-fledged Islamic banks (IBs) are indeed more stable than conventional banking institutions (CBIs), and are better capitalized than their conventional counterparts. IBIs also have less volatile asset returns, less non-performing loans (NPLs) and lower loan loss provisioning. Similar results obtain for Islamic windows of mixed banks compared with conventional windows. The analysis suggests that the loss absorption capacity of Islamic banks leads to less risk taking and a more stable banking system.
Introduction and Literature Review
With risk seeking behavior back to the center stage of world wide policy debates since the credit crisis unfolded, Islamic banking has received renewed attention. The proponents of Islamic finance argue that financial intermediation based on Islamic principles would bring in greater stability in the domestic economy, financial markets and even in the international economy (Chapra (2008) ; El-Gamal (2000) ; Nigel (1998) ; Siddiqi (2006) ; Zaher and Hassan (2001 ) ). Generally Islamic banking institutions (IBIs) need to fulfill the same minimum capital requirements as conventional banking institutions (CBIs) do. However, IBIs have an extra line of protection in the form of mudarabah saving and investment (S&I) deposits based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts.
2 IBIs share their profits or loss with these account holders. Because of this quasi equity structure of debt, the loss absorption capacity of IBIs can be expected to be higher than that of similarly capitalized CBIs. But a key question for their impact on systemic stability concerns the choices IBIs make on their asset side. Are risk shifting incentives actually less than the risks CBIs choose to be exposed to?
We use a classic Merton credit risk framework to show that IBIs can be expected to take lower risks in comparison to their CBI counterparts, IBIs have less incentive for risk shifting, both in and outside of distress situations. Therefore, such banks are expected to be more stable and have better quality. However, specific risks are attached to the structure of IBIs. On the liability side, if the Islamic banks pay lower return to the S&I account holders than the rate paid by other banks or pass some losses to these depositors, they may withdraw their deposits from the Islamic banks. Therefore some have argued that there may be a greater risk of deposit withdrawal for Islamic banks than for conventional banks in times of distress (Sundararajan and Errico (2002 ) ). Especially, for small Islamic banks this risk is considered higher and thus more problematic.
To manage this risk Islamic banks forgo part of their profit share as a mudarib to pay competitive returns to the S&I mudarabah account holders. In case IBIs incur some loss, all that loss may be taken to the income accounts of IBIs, which otherwise has be shared with S&I account holders. This activity exposes the equity holders of Islamic bank to a peculiar risk, called displaced commercial risk. The Islamic Financial Services Board 3 (2011) defines this risk as additional risk borne by shareholders of Islamic financial institutions due to volatility of returns over and above the normal risks when S&I account holders were to share the loss in accordance with mudarabah contract.
In other words, shareholders of an Islamic bank are exposed to additional losses which actually pertain to the S&I depositors. To mitigate this risk Islamic banks create reserve pools by paying lower return to S&I account holders than the actual profit when IBIs returns are higher than the market average return. One the other hand, when they incur losses (or generate lower return than CBIs), the Islamic banks try to smooth the returns through these reserves by paying higher than the actual returns. On the asset side, the risks of IBIs are generally similar to that of leasing or term loans in conventional finance.
Apart from that Islamic banks also have shariah compliance risk which may also affect the goodwill of these banks. But they do have higher volatility in their asset returns, to such an extent that their stability index is lower than that of conventional banking branches (CBBs) of mixed banks. Conversely, NPLs and thus loan loss provisioning by IBBs of both small and large mixed banks is lower in comparison to conventional banking branches of mixed banks.
So Islamic windows of mixed banks also have better asset quality than the conventional windows of those mixed banks.
3 Islamic Financial Services Board is an international standard-setting organization that issues global prudential standards and guiding principles for the Islamic financial industry, broadly defined to include banking, capital markets and insurance sectors.
Review of Empirical Literature on Islamic Banking
An early study on the stability of Islamic banks is Bashir (1999) , at a small scale using Turen (1996) shows that during the period of analysis this bank offered a higher risk adjusted return compared to commercial banks operating in Bahrain at the time and argues that the profit sharing concept of Islamic banking can achieve a higher profitability and lower risk than conventional commercial banks. Al-Deehani, Karim, and Murinde (1999) argue that because of the profit sharing provisions with the depositors, Islamic bank can increase their market value and return on equity without taking on more risk. Using a sample of 12 Islamic banks they provide empirical evidence in support of their theoretical argument.
Theory: Islamic Deposits, Risk Shifting Incentives and Risk Sharing

Risk shifting incentives
Islamic deposits have two characteristics that make them different from regular deposits. First, their return is profit dependent, although with a limited upswing, so they are also different from equity claims in that respect. Their principal value is senior to equity however. A second difference is less rule based and more grounded in practice:
Islamic banks have part of their assets in a reserve account that is used as collateral for the deposits only: equity holders have no access to that pool of assets, also not in "going concern" distress situations 6 . We do not incorporate the collateral pool since that practice is not strictly required by Islamic law. Furthermore, to make the point of differences in risk shifting incentives under Islamic Finance (IF) and Conventional
Finance (CF), we focus on the profit dependency of the rate of return only and ignore credit risk on the principal: since principal is treated the same under both modes of financing, credit risk on the principal (i.e. the Merton put embedded in the principal) has no impact on the difference in risk shifting incentives. 
This is k times the difference between two call options, one with strike price D/k and the other with strike price rD/k where we use C as shorthand for the value of a call option (plus the principal D).
The key issue now is how does that difference depend on the variance or standard deviation of the underlying profit stream? To that end consider first the derivative of C with respect to the volatility (in option pricing jargon, the Vega V): 
where r s equals the risk free interest rate (for which we use the rate on T-bills) 7 . If the derivative of V with respect to the strike price does not change sign over the range [D,rD] , applying the Mean Value theorem (Apostol 1974 ) yields the following expression for the derivative of I IF with respect to the volatility :
( 1)
for an r' satisfying 1 < r' < r. Furthermore, it is straight forward to establish that the derivative of Vega with respect to the strike price K(=r'D/k) equals: 
So the Mean Value theorem (Apostol 1974 ) can be applied and by inserting (5) into (4), we unambiguously establish that the return on Islamic deposits depends negatively on the volatility of the asset portfolio being financed: 6) shows that risk shifting incentives are not eliminated altogether, the value of equity E IF still depends positively on volatility: 
which is also negative. So under Conventional Finance, the dependence of the value of equity E CF on volatility is:
(
Comparison of (7) and (9) allows us to answer the question on the relative sensitivity of Islamic and Conventional Finance:
which establishes our key result: under Islamic Finance, risk shifting incentives are weaker than under Conventional Finance. We should therefore expect Islamic banks to have less risky (lower volatility) asset portfolios. That is the theoretical prediction that we will test in the following empirical sections.
Risk sharing
Risk shifting incentives indicate the extent to which management will try to increase the volatility of the asset portfolio of the bank. But there is a second mechanism through which Islamic deposits may influence bank stability: for given asset side composition, there is more risk sharing on the liability side. That should result in a lower equity price volatility given asset side volatility. If we split off the equity part of Islamic deposits and count it as equity, effective leverage k I is lower with Islamic deposits than conventionally measured . This in turn should lead to lower equity price volatility given asset side volatility than is to be expected given the conventional measure of leverage counting Islamic deposits as debt (k C ):
( 1 ) since
Incorporating the standard Merton-put embedded in the principal would add further terms but is the same for both types of debt so that would not influence the comparison and is omitted.
Accounting treatment of S&I deposits and Capital of Islamic Banking
Institutions
There are some issues about treatment of S&I deposits of Islamic banks for the calculation of equity capital of Islamic banks. Since Islamic banks issue S&I deposits on the PLS 8 basis, these are considered as quasi equity, a category between time deposits and pure equity. These accounts are not deposits in true spirit as the return on these deposits is conditional on the Islamic bank's performance. On the other hand, S&I deposits may not be given the status of equity as unlike equity these accounts are redeemable in nature i.e.
the investment account holders can withdraw them on maturity of these accounts. Even investment accounts can be withdrawn prematurely if an advance notice is given (Čihák and Hesse (2010 ) ) with or without some penalty, depending upon the Islamic bank's policy. Whereas saving accounts are callable deposits and thus can be withdrawn anytime. Therefore, according to Financial Accounting Standard No.6 of Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) these accounts should be treated "as an independent category between liabilities and owners' equity. 9 The S&I accounts provide an extra line of protection for the Islamic banks besides equity when loss occurs to the Islamic bank.
Therefore, in principle these S&I accounts of IBIs should not be considered as liability of these banking institutions. However, in reality, Islamic banks treat these accounts as liabilities as competitive return are paid thereon regardless of the actual returns of the Islamic banks. This may even happen when the actual return of an Islamic bank is lower than the market return or, in extreme case, when the actual return is negative. This is done through the technique in which Islamic bank institutions forgo part of their share in profit as mudarabah, and give the same as a gift (hibah) to the S&I account holders.
According to the instructions of the central bank, Islamic banking institutions are not allowed to include S&I accounts in capital while calculating minimum capital requirement for Basel II and Basel III. For our estimation purpose first we treat these accounts as liabilities to make the indicators of stability comparable for IBIs and CBIs.
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This approach obviously results in lower stability indicators of Islamic banks than would come out if we consider S&I deposits as part of equity. However, we also check the results by treating these accounts as equity of the IBIs to compute the capitalization and stability index of IBIs in that way.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use (2010 )). The Z-score is constructed as the sum of the mean rate of return on assets (µ) and the mean equity-to-assets ratio (k) divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (σ):
Z measures the risk of insolvency or distance to default. By combining accounting measures of profitability, leverage and volatility, it indicates the probability of a loss exceeding the equity capital. The sample data shows that average z-score of Islamic banks is significantly higher than that of conventional banks, portraying that IBIs are more stable than their conventional peers. Specifically, the average z-score for IBIs is 33.63, whereas for conventional banks it is 14.15. Similarly, IBIs are better capitalized than CBIs which leads to higher stability of IBIs than conventional banks. Specifically, the CAR of IBIs is 19.47 percent in comparison to CBI's 5.85 percent. 
Econometric Specification
To evaluate difference in various banking indicators of riskiness and asset quality across both bank types in our data, we estimate the following regressions: (13) operations and fixed assets of the banks to control for size and asset structure of banks.
We first estimate (13) with an intercept and a dummy for IBIs only (in order to compare CBIs and IBIs) without any covariates. Then we control the results for an array of bank/ segment-level time-changing features which might affect the differences across bank types.
We thus include log of assets as a proxy for size. There is, however, no definite relationship between bank size and stability (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013) ). Most of the Islamic banks in Pakistan are in small to medium size bank categories, whereas to tap into the market a few big conventional banks also introduced Islamic banking operations through IBBs. We also include fixed assets to total assets ratio and non-loan earning assets to total assets ratio to control for the opportunity cost of having unproductive assets and non-lending business respectively. specifications without using any control variables. In models 2, 5, 8 and 11 we control for size, and fixed assets and non-loan earning assets both normalized by total assets and total earning assets respectively. Lastly, in models 3, 6, 9 and 12 in both panels of tables 4 and 12 It is apparent that for IBBs (i.e. Islamic segment of mixed banks) the size and asset structure of the parent company would matter. Thus, for example, IBBs of a big (mixed) bank probably have more access to capital market than IBBs of a small (mixed) bank. Therefore, we do not use any controls as the comparison is within bank and at each year quarter. 5, we interact size with dummy for IBIs to disentangle the stability and asset quality of small and large IBIs. In Table 5 , model 1, 3, 5 and 7 report the results of specification (3) that uses bank-quarter fixed effects. In model 2, 4 ,6 and 8 we use dummies for Islamic windows of large and small mixed banks separately.
Conventional vs. Islamic Banking Institutions
Panel A and B of Table 3 below show the main results of specification (13) for various indicators of financial stability and asset quality of Islamic and conventional banking with and without control variables. In Table 3 , 'Islamic' is a dummy for IBIs which includes both full-fledged IBs and IBBs of mixed banks. The estimation without covariates indicates that IBIs fare better than CBIs in financial stability as their z-score is higher than that of CBIs.
In Panel A, both the z-scores, i.e. Z-score A and Z-score B , of the IBIs are significantly higher than that of CBIs. Also, the magnitude of the coefficients is economically meaningful keeping in view the industry average. Specifically, Z-score A is 19 points higher than the same index of CBIs whereas Z-score B of IBIs is understandably much higher than that of CBIs (69 points). However, CAR A of IBIs is not significantly different from that of CBI. Whereas, CAR B 50 points higher than that of CBIs, which is expected because for this measure we treat PLS savings and investment of deposits of IBIs as equity of these institutions. Once we control for the bank/segment level characteristics of size, fixed assets and non-loan earning assets (models 2, 5, 8 and 11), Z-score B of IBIs still remain higher than the same indicator of CBIs showing sound financial stability. Also, IBIs are more capitalized than CBIs in terms of higher CAR B . However, Z-score A and CAR A of IBIs are though positive but statistically insignificant. Table 3 show that there is a significant difference between asset quality of the IBIs and CBIs (Models 1, 4, 7, 10). IBIs have better asset quality than that of CBIs, Table 3 In this table we report the results of specification (13) for whole sample with and without bank level controls. The table reports the estimated coefficients with various stability/solvency (Panel A) and asset quality (Panel B) measures as dependent variable of bank i in year: quarter t. The independent variable Islamic is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the institution is Islamic bank and zero otherwise and size is natural log of the assets. Fixed assets are normalized by the total assets and non-loan earning assets are normalized by the total earning assets of the each banking intuition. Z-score A and CAR A are computed by treating profit and loss saving and investment (PLS) accounts of IBIs as liabilities, whereas Z-score B and Capital-Asset Ratio B is calculated by treating these PLS accounts as equity of the IBIs. The estimations use various numbers of banking institution-year: quarter observations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank (segment) level. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Some (statistically significant) stylized facts of the bank level control variables stand out. Larger banks carry less NPLs to gross loans and thus are required to make less provisioning as well. Thus, the asset quality of the banks improves as they become larger.
Panel B of
In emerging economies where firms are mostly dependent on bank loans and loan demand is high the bigger banks are better placed to pick better quality firms to finance.
However, as expected, large banks have higher profitability (ROA) due to the economies of scale. Though statistically insignificant, larger banks have lower z-score mainly due to lower capitalization. Regarding correlation of size and stability, theoretical and empirical literature is inconclusive (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013 ) ).
Since size of an Islamic bank may affect the stability (Čihák and Hesse (2010 ) ) and asset quality (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013 ) IBIs, therefore, are significantly more stable than large CBIs.
Conventional Banking Institutions vs. full-fledged Islamic Banks and Islamic
Banking Branches of Mixed Banks
As mentioned before, Islamic banking operations in Pakistan are carried out by two different kinds of entities, full-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic banking branches of mixed banks. So next we split the sample of IBIs into IBs and IBBs of mixed banks by using a dummy for each category separately to see whether they differ from CBIs. We thus estimate specification (14).
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of specification (14) We interact dummies for IBs and IBBs with size separately to check how size affects the coefficients of these institutions for different variables. The results, shown in Table 4 Panel A and B (models 3, 6, 9 and 12), signify that in comparison to conventional peers, small IBs are more stable as they have higher z-scores and better capitalization. IBIs also have superior asset quality because of the lower NPLs. Specifically, the coefficient of z-score and capital asset ratio of small full-fledged IBs is 2.6 times and 1.6 times greater than that of This is obvious from the fact that if we calculate coefficient of size of IBs for loan loss provisioning and NPLs by separately adding coefficient (4) and (7) for the relevant indicators, these turns out to be 1.6 and 3.5 respectively. The fact that size impacts Islamic banks' asset quality negatively is also revealed by Čihák and Hesse (2010) .
However, this is not the case for IBBs of the mixed banks as their NPLs and provisioning go down with increase in their size. Volatility of returns of small and large IBIs is less than that of CBIs, showing that their assets are less risky as size of IBIs does not impact the riskiness of their returns. Due to increase in size, the differences between IBBs and CBIs decrease for the asset quality. (14). The table reports the estimated coefficients with various stability (Panel A) and asset quality (Panel B) measures as dependent variables of bank i in year: quarter t. The independent variables Islamic Banks and Islamic Branches are dummies which takes value of 1 if the institution is full-fledged Islamic bank or Islamic branches of the mixed banks respectively and zero otherwise. Size is natural log of the assets. Fixed assets are normalized by the total assets and non-loan earning assets are normalized by the total earning assets of the each banking intuition. Z-score A and CAR A is treating profit and loss saving and investment (PLS) accounts of IBIs as liabilities, whereas Z-score B and CAR B is calculated by treating these PLS accounts as equity of the IBIs. The estimations use numbers banking institution-year: quarter observations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank (segment) level. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Panel A Stability
Bank-quarter Fixed Effects: Conventional vs. Islamic Windows of Mixed Banks
The data also provide us with the opportunity to use bank-quarter fixed effects, since we have some banks that host both Islamic and conventional banking separately through Islamic and conventional banking branches. Bank-quarter fixed effects permit us to control for any time variant observed and unobserved heterogeneity. This specification thus shows how
Islamic banking operations of mixed banks are different from their conventional operations within the same bank and quarter in terms of financial stability and asset quality. Since specification with fixed effects takes into account only those banks which have both types of banking windows, the sample observations decrease by about half. 
Robustness
We check the robustness of our estimations by using the original un-winsorized data. The unreported results are not different from the baseline results which indicate insignificance of outliers in the estimation process. Next, using contemporaneous control variables of size and asset structure, i.e. fixed assets and non-lending, of the banks may create endogeneity problem in the estimation due to reverse causality. We therefore replace contemporaneous control variables with lag values of the control variables in a robust estimation. The robust specification results support our findings of baseline estimation. Similarly, following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2013) we also estimate the specifications using an alternative method of median least squares which minimizes the median squares of residual and is, therefore, robust to outliers (Clarke and Fuchs (2007 ) ). However, we cannot cluster standard errors at bank level in this method. The findings do not change using to this method either.
Age and experience of a bank may influence the differences between Islamic and conventional banking across all indicators of stability and asset quality. Thus it may be the case that asset quality of the IBIs turns out to be better than that of CBIs because age differences between IBIs and CBIs. Therefore, the difference in behavior of IBIs from CBIs may not be because of Islamic characteristics per se. To disentangle this effect, we reestimate the specifications with an additional control for age and experience of a bank that we proxy by the number of years a bank has been in the business. The results confirm that the differences between Islamic and conventional banking for baseline specifications are not due to age and experience. Thus, our baseline results still stay valid. Finally, we also use number of bank branches (outlets) as a proxy for a bank's experience as it is generally expected that older banks will have larger numbers of branches. Our results are also robust to this alternative specification.
Conclusion
Using data from Pakistan, where conventional and Islamic banks co-exist, we investigate how Islamic banking institutions are different from conventional banking institutions in terms of asset quality and stability. We find that Islamic banking institutions (IBIs) performed better than conventional banks in profitability and asset quality during the sample period. Specifically, NPLs and provisioning to gross loans ratios of IBIs are lower than the same indicators of conventional banks. Thorough analysis shows that IBs have not only better asset quality but also are more stable than CBIs whereas IBBs though have higher zscore, do not differ significantly from conventional banking institutions. However, IBBs are more profitable, have less volatility in ROAs and have lower NPLs and resulting loan loss provisioning than CBIs. If we treat S&I accounts of IBIs issued on the basis of PLS risk sharing as part of (equity) capital,we find that IBIs are more stable, and have better a asset quality than CBIs.
Estimation with bank-quarter fixed effects suggest on the contrary that Islamic operations of small mixed banks have higher capital to asset ratio and are more profitable, but have higher volatility of returns on their assets. As a consequence, stability index of these IBBs is lower than that of conventional part of mixed banks. This is if we treat risk sharing S&I deposits of IBBs as their liabilities. IBBs, of both small and large mixed banks, also exhibit superior asset quality due to lower NPLs and thus provisioning than CBBs. Also IBBs of small mixed banks are more profitable than CBBs and, IBBs of large mixed banks are not significantly different from that of small ones in this regard.
The results have important implications for the co-existence of conventional and Islamic banking systems. Our results imply that there is an inherent difference in the stability (zscore) and asset quality of IBIs and CBIs. Therefore, our evidence suggests that the presence of Islamic banks improves financial stability. Due to profit and loss sharing deposits, Islamic banking institutions have less incentive for risk shifting. As a consequence, these institutions have better asset quality and are more stable than their conventional counterparts.
